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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial motion denied by the trial 
court in a case alleging Ms. White committed the crimes of Attempted Criminal 
Homicide, a first degree felony, and Criminal Mischief, a second degree felony. 
The interlocutory order appealed herein is the denial of a motion in limine to 
permit the introduction of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress1 at 
the jury trial in her defense. The Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court, entered a denial of that request on December 10, 2007. 
1
 This defense is codified within the Homicide statute itself at Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203(4). See page v, supra; also reproduced in part, infra, p. 15-16. The 
extreme emotional distress defense is more accurately and completely stated as 
"extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse." Ms. White will refer to the defense intending its full verbiage with the 
shorthand of "extreme emotional distress." 
1 
Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Ms. White 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to permit an appeal from this interlocutory 
order (as well as one other related motion and denial) of the trial court. The 
Supreme Court transferred the petition to this Court, R. 697, who on January 31, 
2008, granted the petition for permission to appeal this interlocutory order raised 
herein. See Addendum B for of copy of this Court's order granting the petition on 
the denial of the motion in limine issue only. A copy of the trial court's findings 
of facts and conclusions of law and order are attached in the addenda at 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Brenda Christine White was charged by Amended Information with two 
counts of criminal conduct: Attempted Murder, a First Degree Felony, and 
Criminal Mischief, a second degree felony. The charges stemmed from a single 
event occurring the 26th day of April, 2006, at 4021 South 700 East, a building 
complex known as the Woodlands Tower II, in Salt Lake County. R. 1-3. 
On April 26, 2006, Brenda White arrived at the Woodland Towers office 
building to meet with her ex-husband Jon White to acquire his participation in 
refinancing the home mortgage as he had previously and repeatedly promised. Jon 
White told her to return later to talk. R. 711 at 31-33. 
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The couple had been married for eleven years; two children were born 
during the marriage. R. 711 at 28, 65-67. Jon White moved out of the home prior 
to Thanksgiving in November of 2005. Id. As a result of a mediation agreement, 
Jon White had promised to assist in refinancing the two mortgages, giving up his 
equity in the house to Ms. White in lieu of making any payments of alimony or 
paying any bills, including any portion of either of the mortgages. R 711 at 32. 
Mr. White, however, then refused to cooperate with the refinance leaving her in 
financial disaster. She returned and they talked about the refinancing; he refused 
to assist with the refinancing as he had promised. Instead he utilized his leverage 
on her need for the refinance to pressure her to sign divorce papers. R.711 at 36. 
He returned to work and she left the area. R 711 at 34, 40. 
Ms. White returned later that day, around 4:30 p.m., to again beseech her 
ex-husband for the assistance he had promised. R. 446, 448. She observed him 
exiting the office complex talking on a cell phone, a cell phone that he had 
repeatedly told her he did not own. R. 711 at 75. Ms. White had tried for months 
to obtain cell phone information from Jon White to facilitate communications with 
his children and to arrange visiting schedules for the two children. Jon White had 
repeatedly responded that he did not posses a cell phone. R. 448-49; 711 at 75. 
The State's probable cause statement from the Information describes the 
next events as follows: 
The defendant drove over the raised curb of the parking structure 
[where Jon White was leaving work] and chased Mr. White through the 
parking lot as he ran toward the Woodland Towers. Mr. White entered the 
3 
east side of the building through a double set of glass doors. Mr. White 
continued to run through the building to a lobby on the west side. The 
defendant drove her vehicle through the glass doors and down a hallway to 
the lobby. The defendant struck Mr. White with the explorer, causing Mr. 
White to flip over the vehicle and fall to the ground. The defendant drove 
through the lobby windows and stopped her vehicle. The defendant put 
her vehicle in reverse and backed into the lobby. Mr. White stood up and 
fled down a side hallway. The defendant turned her car around in the 
lobby and stopped the vehicle. 
Mr. White received several cuts and abrasion to his hands, legs, 
arms and face. Mr. White's ankle was dislocated. 
R. 2-3. A more detailed version of the facts of those events is contained in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order prepared by the prosecution 
and found in Addendum A. That rendition of the facts includes a recitation of Jon 
White's testimony from the preliminary hearing which indicates that after he had 
again refused to cooperate and assist in the refinance, Ms. White played a song on 
her car radio which contained the lyrics, "I want to kill you. I want to blow you 
away." Ms. White joined her fingers together, mimicked as a gun; and as the 
music played told him that when her father took her shooting, she thought about 
shooting him. Jon White testified that this action was repeated numerous times. 
He also testified that she also referred to him as a parasite and that she was going 
to wipe him off the earth. Id.; R. 711 at 35-38. 
A preliminary hearing on the matter was held December 1, 2006. During 
the preliminary hearing the prosecutor inquired how long prior to the divorce had 
he contemplated thoughts or discussions of divorce. R. 711 at 60-65. Jon White 
testified that over five years it progressively had gotten worse. He also indicated 
he had moved out earlier in 2004 for a period of time. During cross-examination 
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of Jon White, the defense attempted to inquire into specifics about the 
deterioration of the marriage, manipulation of Ms. White, the divorce and other 
related issues. R. 711 at 60-64. The court initially permitted that questioning over 
the objection of the State. However, when the defense began to explore questions 
regarding sexual relations, the State objected again. R. 711 at 70-72. The defense 
insisted that not only had the State opened the door, but also indicated its intent to 
present and develop the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress2 through 
such questioning. The court ruled that the defense could question Mr. White about 
anything he may have done to try to provoke his ex-wife but sustained the 
objection about sexual relations. Id., R. 711 at 74-76. 
The State sought a clarification of the magistrate's use of the term 
"provocation" attempting to limit the inquiry to only events of the day of the 
alleged crimes. R. 711 at 71. An in-chambers discussion occurred where the 
defense proffered the testimony of certain actions and events which the ex-
husband employed over the more recent period of the marriage to manipulate and 
distress Ms. White. R. 711 at 74-82. This testimony included Jon White's 
treatment of Ms. White through the marriage, including a rather recent period of 
Jon White's marital infidelity, an extra-marital affair with a co-worker. R. 711 at 
2
 Once again, this defense is codified within the Homicide statute itself at Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4). The statute is contained in pertinent part, infra, at p. 15-
16, and in fuller text, supra at v. The extreme emotional distress defense is more 
accurately and completely stated as "extreme emotional distress for which there is 
a reasonable explanation or excuse." Ms. White will refer to the defense intending 
its full verbiage with the shorthand of "extreme emotional distress." 
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75-76. The defense also proffered an instance later in the marriage documented by 
a police investigation and report of the possession and use/abuse of child 
pornography by Jon White. R. 711 at 73-75. Additionally, the defense introduced 
a proffer describing a sexual tryst the ex-husband had arranged where he 
orchestrated a "threesome" with yet another co-worker and Ms. White. R. 711 at 
74-80. 
Other problems existed in the marriage and more specifically the 
dissolution of the marriage and were proffered to the district court in support of 
the motion in limine. R. 714. Ms. White and the children were not receiving any 
financial support from Jon White from the time he left at Thanksgiving of 2005 
and she was forced to make a mediation agreement in January to settle the divorce 
on the promise of getting some money to support the family. Poor legal advice 
assured her that giving up monthly income via alimony, house and bill payments 
was a fair trade for his half of the equity in the home. R. 443-50. There were no 
temporary orders obtained by her lawyer to provide for interim payments and the 
settlement agreement signed in January provided none, except for child support 
beginning in March. Id. 
Ms. White was on medications for anxiety, depression and sleep. R. 444. 
During this time Jon White was to provide health coverage for the family but on 
two separate occasions he cancelled the coverage causing a lapse in her ability to 
acquire the medication which resulted in an increase in her anger, her depression 
and all that went with it. Ms. White, on one occasion, was required to go to Jon 
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White's workplace herself to have the insurance benefits reinstated. In the 
meantime she was without her medications. She had no money to pay for them. 
Moreover, she deteriorated in her mental state and ability to deal with all that was 
going on around her. Id. 
She was a single mother of two children working a $ 12.50 cent an hour 
job, at a telephone call center, with new financial obligations of approximately $ 
1,400.00 per month on a first and second mortgage, plus credit card debt resulting 
from the marriage of another $ 200.00 to $ 300.00 per month and all the other 
family expenses. R. 433, 443-450. 
Ms. White had to increase her work from part-time to Ml time; and in fact, 
began to work overtime—often working up to as much as 60-70 hours a week to 
try and make ends meet. Id. Ms. White saw less of her children than before which 
resulted in additional stressors from the children. And at the same time, Jon White 
began to withdraw from participating with the children. R. 446. Jon White would 
make the visits difficult for Ms. White, for example he would insist on an 8 o' 
clock pickup of the children on times when he knew Ms. White was in a group 
counseling class that did not terminate until 8 p.m. Id. He would require that Ms. 
White leave the counseling sessions early to pick up the children at 8 p.m., rather 
than waiting until 8:15 p.m., or he would require her to arrange for someone else 
to do so. 
As money became more difficult her ability to pay for medications 
decreased and her doctor assisted by providing sample packets of the medications 
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whenever she could. However, that doctor died in early April leaving her without 
a treatment doctor and without appropriate medication. R. 446-47; 711 at 79. 
The mediation agreement, determined in January, to eventually become the 
divorce settlement, still left her without finances. The unfortunate settlement 
provided that Ms. White would receive the equity in the home, but would be 
required to pay from that equity an approximated additional $ 10,000.00 of debt 
accumulated during the marriage. Of course, she had to pay these bills in the 
interim, while waiting for the settlement date to arrive. R. 447. 
While the settlement agreement would provide Ms. White with child 
support of approximately $ 650.00 per month, no relief was in sight. R. 447. She 
fell behind in house and bill payments despite working so much overtime. As part 
of the settlement agreement urged on her by her counsel, Jon White insisted that 
he not participate in paying the house payments and that he surrender his half of 
the equity in trade for no alimony and no payments. Id. 
The unfortunate reality of the settlement was that the equity she now had in 
the home was of no value unless she could get the money out and pay the living 
expenses, mortgages and other bills. Id. If she could not refinance the mortgages 
and get the equity out to live on she could even lose the house. Ms. White began 
to see the potential of this reality after the settlement and her finances did not 
improve. R. 447-48. She desired to refinance the home to free up that money to 
live on and pay the bills as anticipated in the agreement. However, due to her 
short work history, large debt and late payments, Ms. White could not get a loan to 
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refinance the home. Ms. White approached Jon White for the assistance with the 
refinance that he had promised, and he vacillated and backed out of his agreement 
to do so. R. 447-48; 711 at 33-35. 
Ms. White could not obtain the refinancing without him. Id. 
She finally contacted new counsel and discussed attempting to re-open the 
divorce agreement as unworkable. R. 444, 448. 
Jon White then agreed to assist with the refinance but then he would back 
out again. R. 448. 
The relationship between Jon White and the children became more 
problematic. He spent less time with them, disappointed them more and was 
unavailable for contact. Ms. White requested that he provide his cell phone 
number to her so the kids could contact him directly, but he repeatedly told her 
that he did not have one. R. 448-49. He was becoming less and less involved in 
caring for and caring about his family. Id. 
The day of the incident, April 26th, Ms. White went to Jon White's 
workplace earlier in the day to speak with him and have him talk on the phone to 
the mortgage broker. He refused to do so until later. When she went back the 
second time, he spoke with the mortgage banker but he would not cooperate in the 
refinance. R. 711 at 33-34. 
Ms. White left his workplace but returned a second time to again speak 
with him about the refinance of the mortgages and assisting in providing for his 
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children. Ms. White felt he had promised to assist her in releasing the equity from 
the home. R. 448. 
When Ms. White saw Jon White leave the workplace talking on a cell 
phone, a cell phone that he denied owning for communication with the children. 
Ms. White was overcome with all that has been described above. R. 449. Her 
anger, agitation, loss, grief and the disappointment for her and the children 
resulted in her inability to control herself. Those emotions controlled her actions. 
R. 448-49. 
These events and others including the fact that Ms. White was only recently 
aware that Jon White now was actively dating the co-worker with whom he had 
the affair, were at the base of the defense theory of the case supporting the request 
to permit the defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury. R. 447-49. All of 
these events were described as occurring within the last two to three years, some 
even more recent in time, prior to the offenses in question. R. 711 at 76. 
The district court denied the motion in limine. R. 648; R. 715. Both the 
State and the trial court agree with the defense request to petition for interlocutory 
review and indicated that appellate review and guidance would be of benefit and 
should be sought. R. 715 at 11. The Utah Supreme Court transferred that petition 
to this Court which granted the petition on the issue now presented. R. 697; 
Addendum B. This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously concluded the law and then misapplied that law 
to the facts of this case as described in the factual section beginning on page 2 
herein. This Court should find these facts to be more than sufficient evidence to 
meet the corrected standard of presenting the case to the jury on the defense of 
extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. 
While the State may take that same evidence and claim an intentional act to 
commit murder, reasonable minds may differ whether the average reasonable 
person under those same stressors and circumstances would have an extreme 
emotional reaction to it and experience a loss of self-control such that the person's 
reason would be overborne by the intense feelings discussed above. That 
understanding is all that is required for this Court to reverse the trial court decision 
and authorize introduction of the defense. 
In Ms. White's case, no single violent event triggered her behavior. Rather 
a loss of self control arguably occurred due to a lengthy repeated and escalating 
pressure overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief, 
excessive agitation and similar emotions. These stressors very realistically were 
extreme and overwhelming for someone in her shoes which were reasonably 
brought about over time by the external forces of Jon White's behavior towards 
her, coupled with the escalating financial pressures and extreme family and work 
stressors, including the death of her doctor and counselor and the changes in her 
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medicine regime. Her circumstances meet the requirements of submitting the 
affirmative defense to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. WHITE'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO TO INTRODUCE THE AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE JURY. 
The trial court erroneously denied Ms. White's motion in limine to present 
the defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury by making four distinct 
conclusions of law. R. 651-52.; Addendum A, at 4-5. In short, the trial court 
denied the motion by concluding as a matter of law that Ms. White did not present 
sufficient evidence to justify an argument to the jury that she suffered from 
extreme emotional distress when she allegedly committed the offenses in question. 
Conclusion # 1; R. 651; Addendum A at 4. The trial court then omitted an 
important subjective statutory perspective (the viewpoint of the reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances) when it concluded as a matter of law that 
factors proffered by Ms. White would not cause the average reasonable person to 
suffer from extreme emotional distress. Conclusion # 2; R. 651; Addendum A at 
4-5. 
The third conclusion of the trial court erroneously determined that Ms. 
White's claimed defense of extreme emotional distress was inadequate as a matter 
of law due to stressors being too remote in time and lacking a highly provocative 
triggering event. Conclusion # 3; R. 652; Addendum A at 5. Finally, the fourth 
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conclusion of law replaced the trial judgment for that of a jury and concluded that 
Ms. White did not lose self-control, had a plan and was aware of what she was 
doing as evidenced by the complicated driving pattern of negotiating a chase and a 
crash into the lobby of an office building in pursuit of her alleged victim. 
Conclusion # 4; R. 652; Addendum A at 5. 
Each conclusion of the trial court is erroneous and denies Ms. White her 
right to a fair trial and present her defense as due process dictates. 
A. Ms. White enjoys the right to present her defense to the jury. 
It has long been the law that a Defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support 
that theory. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980)(emphasis added). 
Ms. White indicated an intent to rely on the defense of "extreme emotional distress 
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse," an affirmative defense. As 
an affirmative defense, much like self defense, the defendant desiring to utilize 
that defense must initially demonstrate a sufficient basis from which jurors may 
entertain the defense in order for the question to be submitted to the jury. Our 
Supreme Court has instructed on this basic due process principle: 
If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict with the State's 
proof, be such that the jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether 
or not he acted in self-defense, he is entitled to have the jury instructed 
fully and clearly on the law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable 
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight as to be incapable of 
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to whether a defendant 
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accused of a crime acted in self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are 
properly refused. 
Id. at 265-66 (quoting State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah I960)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals reaffirmed this proposition in stating, "It is well 
established that a "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory 
of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support that theory." State v. 
Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 44-45 (Utah App,1990Xquoting State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 
261, 265 (Utah 1980)(emphasis in original)). 
Ms. White insists there is ample basis in the evidence developed thus far, 
and perhaps even additional evidence to be developed,3 to support her theory of 
the affirmative defense that she suffered from extreme emotional distress for 
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse at the time of the criminal events 
as alleged by the State in this matter. 
Case law supports her position. The Utah Supreme Court has discussed * 
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress and rather decidedly 
dispelled the errors contained in the trial court's analysis and conclusions of law. 
In State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94, the Court ruled: . * * 
We conclude that defendant was entitled to an instruction under [extreme 
emotional distress] because a jury could conclude that [Shumway] caused 
the death of [the victim] "under the influence of extreme emotional distress 
3
 Ms. White refers to the fact that the trial court indicated its willingness to allow 
the alleged victim to be deposed and the answers to the questions desired at the 
preliminary hearing (and others) obtained from Jon White. R. 713 at 15. Such 
questions would undoubtedly develop additional information in support of the type 
and depth of stressors placed on Ms. White. Due to the current posture of the 
case, such a deposition has yet to occur. 
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for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." In holding that the 
defendant was entitled to an instruction under [extreme emotional 
distress], we do not suggest that [Shumway's] version of the events that 
took place is the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Most 
disturbing, of course, is the fact that the medical examiner testified that 
Christopher had been stabbed thirty-nine times. However, in State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264, 266 (Utah 1988), we approved of the giving 
of instructions for manslaughter and self-defense based on the defendant's 
theory of the case where he had stabbed the victim 107 times. See also 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753-55 (Utah 1986), in which we held that 
the defendant would be entitled to an instruction on extreme emotional 
distress manslaughter where the victim had been stabbed twenty-seven 
times and died of multiple critical wounds. 
Shumway, 63 P.3d at 113. 
Again, Shumway underscores the law that a defendant is entitled to present 
her theory to the jury if there is any basis in the evidence to support that claim. 
Here, in Ms. White's case, there is at least as much credibility (and Ms. White 
asserts much more so) than in the claims of extreme emotional distress that had 
been withheld from presentation in Shumway and the cases cited therein. 
B. Ms. White's circumstances, a subjective view, were erroneously 
omitted from the trial court's analysis. 
The defense of extreme emotional distress is more completely defined in the 
statute, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(4): 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder 
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the 
death of another: 
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(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
(4)(a)(i)... shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(emphasis added). 
The trial court's conclusion misunderstands the statute as applied to Ms. 
White. Its conclusion fatally omitted a critical subjective component to the 
defense, to wit: the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse "shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances." The trial court's conclusion does not take the analysis far 
enough. Its second conclusion failed to employ the subjective component of the 
statutory defense. See R. 651-52; Addendum A at 4-5. 
The correct inquiry is not simply asking "would a reasonable person have 
done what defendant did?" Rather, the reasonableness standard evaluates the 
defendant's excuse or explanation for the behavior; the circumstances as they 
existed for the defendant. The reasonableness requirement evaluates the 
defendant's excuse, not her actions. The proper inquiry demands that "the 
reasonableness of the explanation or excuse should be determined from the 
viewpoint of the average, reasonable person under the then-existing 
circumstances:' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d439, 471 (Utah 1988)(emphasis 
added). This determination "should be made by viewing the subjective, internal 
situation in which the defendant found himself and the external circumstances as 
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he perceived them at the time, however inaccurate that perception may have been, 
and assessing from that standpoint whether the explanation or excuse for his 
emotional disturbance was reasonable, so as to entitle him to a reduction of the 
crime charged from murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first 
degree." People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310. 1316 (N,Y. 1980). 
The objective reasonableness requirement of the extreme emotional 
distress defense does not ask the jury whether a reasonable person would behave 
in such a way. Indeed, the state unsuccessfully made this flawed argument in 
Shumway, arguing that "no reasonable person.. .teased by a good friend playing 
with a knife during a sleepover, would have become so enraged or experience such 
an extreme emotional disturbance as to cause him to kill that person by cutting his 
throat and stabbing him thirty-nine times/' Shumway, 63 P.3d at f^ 12. As a New 
York court explained, "[i]t should be stressed that the issue.. .is not whether the 
defendant's act of killing his wife was a reasonable response under the 
circumstances for, clearly, it was not. Rather, the issue is the reasonableness of the 
explanation offered for the defendant's extreme emotional reaction." People v. 
Liebman, 583 N.Y.S.2d234, 241 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1992). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Bishop listed three principal elements as 
requisite to finding the application of extreme emotional disturbance: 
[A] person suffers from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance: 
(1) when he has no mental illness as defined in § 76-2-305 (insanity or 
diminished capacity); and 
(2) when he is exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress; and 
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(3) when the average reasonable person under that stress would have an 
extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which he would experience 
a loss of self-control and that person's reason would be overborne by 
intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, 
or other similar emotions. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471 (emphasis in original). All that is required to support the 
claim for the defense is some external initiating circumstance accompanied by 
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress and that a reasonable person under 
that stress would have an extreme emotional reaction to it. Id. 
Since Bishop the statute has been amended and extreme emotional 
disturbance has been re-written to extreme emotional distress. Of course, a 
reasonable explanation or excuse is still required, but the change in term to 
"distress" is itself significant. A "disturbance" may be more easily definable as a 
single event where "distress" more easily connotes a build-up over time. For 
example, Blacks Law Dictionary defines "disturbance" as "an act" or "a wrong" 
where "emotional distress" is defined as "a highly unpleasant mental reaction 
(such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from another 
person's conduct; emotional pain and suffering. Blacks Law Dictionary, 8 
edition, 511 & 563, respectively. The trial court did not address nor account for 
this amended language in assessing the subjective perspective of Ms. White's 
circumstances. 
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C. The trial court erred in requiring a contemporaneous highly 
provocative triggering event. 
Our Supreme Court, somewhat recently, has discussed in detail the 
question of extreme emotional disturbance in two additionally helpful and 
instructive ways. First, in Shumway, the Court, citing Bishop, stated: 
Turning first to consideration under [extreme emotional disturbance], we 
explained in State v. Bishop, 753 P2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), that a 
person suffers from an extreme emotional disturbance "when he is exposed 
to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress" such that the average 
reasonable person under that stress would have an extreme emotional 
reaction to it, as a result of which he would experience a loss of self-
control and that person's reason would be overborne by intense feelings 
such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar 
emotions. Id. However, an extreme emotional disturbance will not serve 
to reduce murder to manslaughter if the actor brought about his own 
mental disturbance. Gardner, 789 P.2d 282-83; § 76-5-203(3)(b)(ii). 
State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94, ^ 9 (Utah 2002)(citations in original)(emphasis 
added). The facts in Shumway inarguably provide the necessary clarification and 
direction that "distress" as contrasted with "disturbance" need not and perhaps 
rarely is an isolated event. Moreover, the initiating circumstance (heretofore 
called a "trigger") was not as highly provocative and violent an initiating event as 
described by the State. 
In Shumway the Court described that initiating circumstances as follows: 
One interpretation of the evidence supports the necessity for a 
manslaughter instruction under subsection (3)(a)(i). Brookes [the 
defendant] disclosed to police that on the morning of the altercation 
Christopher was irritated at him for beating Christopher at video games. As 
the boys went to bed, Christopher went to the kitchen and retrieved a knife 
that he began to throw in the air and catch. Christopher then lunged at 
Brookes and began poking him with the knife. The boys wrestled over 
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control of the knife and in his anger, Brookes stabbed Christopher. 
Brookes also suffered stab wounds to his hand. There was evidence that 
Christopher had a reputation for being a "hothead" and losing his temper, 
while Brookes was known to be cooperative and peaceful. Other evidence 
supported the argument that Brookes had been bullied and pushed around 
by his peers since he was in the third grade, and that all of this "came out 
on Chris" when the boys fought over the knife. 
Id. at T| 10. The facts revealed that Shumway was 15 years old at the time of the 
murder; third graders are 8 or 9 years of age so this particular and determined to 
be a relevant distress factor relied on by the Court in Shumway was over 6 or 
seven years old. Similarly the Court spoke of reputation evidence which by 
practical definition cannot be created from a single event but must necessarily be 
ascertained over time. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that circumstances which may have 
occurred years prior to the offense could certainly contribute to the defendant's 
mental state at the time of the offense, and likewise could be considered by a jury 
in determining whether the defendant acted under the influence of "extreme 
emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." The 
Court reversed the murder conviction In Shumway because the jury was not 
instructed appropriately and was not allowed to determine the reasonableness of 
the defendant's acts under those stressors. 
The Utah Supreme Court also recently reviewed and upheld the Court of 
Appeals decision in State v. Spillers, 2005 UT App. 283, 116 P.3d 985, affd 152 
P.3d 315 (Utah 2007). There the State had appealed the Court of Appeal's 
decision claiming that court erred in reversing the conviction because of the trial 
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court's failure to give an extreme emotional distress instruction. The State 
claimed, as the State does here, that Spillers did not merit the instruction. 
[T]he State's assertion rests on its own conclusion that Defendant acted 
"rationally" throughout the encounter; however, the question of whether 
Defendant acted "rationally" is a question of fact properly belonging to the 
jury. While a jury could adopt the State's version of events and convict 
Defendant of murder, a jury could also believe Defendant's interpretation 
of the evidence and conclude that he was not acting rationally, but rather 
was under extreme emotional distress as a result of Jackson's attack and 
convict on the lesser offense of manslaughter. 
Second, the State contends that Defendant did not present evidence that he 
was in fact experiencing "extreme emotional distress." Rather, the State 
maintains that Defendant merely testified that he felt nervous and that the 
blow to his head left him feeling cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared-
terms not indicative, in the State's view, of extreme emotional distress. 
State v. Spillers nil. 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315, K1f 18-19. The trial court's 
conclusions, similar to the State's position in Spillers IL rests on the conclusion 
that defendant acted rationally. As the Court stated there, whether she acted 
rationally here is a question of fact properly presented to the jury. 
In contrast, and demonstrating the trial court's error here, the Supreme 
Court in Spillers II characterized those facts as follows: 
Like Shumway this case could be interpreted to support Defendant's 
contention that he experienced extreme emotional distress and was 
therefore entitled to a manslaughter instruction. Defendant testified that he 
and Jackson were arguing prior to the altercation and that Jackson was 
upset with him, accusing him of snitching to drug enforcement officers. 
The tone of the conversation made Defendant nervous. Defendant stated 
that Jackson retrieved a firearm and struck Defendant on the back of the 
head. Defendant testified that the blow left him cloudy, dazed, 
uncomfortable, and scared. According to the nurse's testimony, the blow 
may have resulted in a two-inch hematoma that was present on Defendant's 
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head the day after the shooting. Defendant testified that after being struck, 
he turned to face Jackson, who was cocking his arm back to strike 
Defendant again. At that point, Defendant shot Jackson three times, 
although at trial he testified that he remembered firing only a single shot. 
Further, witnesses testified that Jackson had a reputation for violence. 
Thus, a rational jury could, adopting Defendant's version of events, find 
that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress for which there was a 
reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot Jackson. 
Id. at |^ 16. This case, like Shumway, relies on the initiating incident only as the 
starting point for the analysis allowing the jury to determine the reasonableness, if 
any, to the claimed affirmative defense. Again, a reputation is acquired over time, 
permitting something less than a single highly provocative triggering event to 
justify granting the defense. The trial court's opinion to the contrary is erroneous. 
R. 652; Addendum A at 5. 
D. Cumulative effects from stressors permissibly justify the defense of 
extreme emotional distress. 
In a recognized landmark case addressing extreme emotional distress, a 
New York court illuminated the long history leading to the recognition of the 
cumulative effect of events in these cases: 
An action influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one that is 
necessarily so spontaneously undertaken. Rather, it may be that a 
significant mental trauma has affected a defendant's mind for a substantial 
period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then 
inexplicably coming to the fore. The differences between the present New 
York statute and its predecessor and its ancient Maine analogue can be 
explained by the tremendous advances made in psychology since 1881 and 
a willingness on the part of the courts, legislators, and the public to reduce 
the level of responsibility imposed on those whose capacity has been 
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diminished by mental trauma. It is consistent with modern criminological 
thought to reduce the defendant's criminal liability upon proof of mitigating 
circumstances which render his conduct less blameworthy. 
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976). 
Another court listed several examples of cases where extreme emotional 
distress was determined to be a result of cumulative effects: 
[I]n every case we have read there has been some connection between the 
victim and the slayer precipitating or aggravating an emotional response in 
the defendant. See, e.g., Elliott, supra (defendant, who shot his brother, was 
acting under an extreme emotional disturbance caused by combination of 
child-custody problems, the inability to maintain a recently purchased 
home, and an overwhelming fear of his brother); Ratliff v. Comonwealth. 
567 S.W.2d 307 (Ky.1978) (defendant believed victim was a conspirator 
against her); People v. Cassasa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769, 404 
N.E.2d 1310 (1980), cert, denied 449 U.S. 842, 101 S.Ct. 122, 66 L.Ed.2d 
50 (1980) (victim rejected defendant as a suitor) 
State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 659 (N.D. 1982). 
The Elliott matter, noted above, is particularly instructive as therein the 
court stated the following as very similar evidence to Ms. White's case was 
introduced about the claimed defense that had been denied the defendant. 
The defendant offered into evidence the testimony of a psychiatrist 
who interviewed the defendant about eleven months after the shooting. The 
psychiatrist testified that the defendant, at the time of the shooting, was 
acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance caused by 
a combination of child custody problems, the inability to maintain a 
recently purchased home and an overwhelming fear of his brother. The 
psychiatrist placed particular emphasis on the history of conflict between 
the two brothers, noting that the defendant referred to his brother as a 
"ranger killer." The defendant told the psychiatrist that at one time his 
brother pulled him from a bus and chased him with a tire iron. The 
defendant stated that this incident was so frightening that it caused him to 
leave the area for a couple of years. The psychiatrist believed that this 
incident compounded by many other extenuating circumstances resulted in 
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the defendant's overwhelming fear of his brother. And he testified that 
these circumstances taken together constituted a reasonable explanation of 
the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance. 
State v.EUiott. 177 Conn. 1, 2, 411 A.2d 3, 8 (1979)(emphasis added). The court 
there found that the jury should have been instructed on the correct subjective 
perspective and reversed the convicting remanding for a new trial. Id. at 10. 
E. Additional Considerations support that Ms. White is entitled to the 
defense. 
Several other helpful points were articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Spillers II which further demonstrates the error committed by the trial court in this 
matter. First, the Court instructs that the extreme emotional distress request for 
instruction is to be considered the same as an instruction on a lesser included 
offense and that the instruction "must be given if (i) the statutory elements of 
greater and lesser included offenses overlap ... and (ii) the evidence provides a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense." Spillers II, 152 P.3d_at f^ 12. 
Second, very importantly, the Court reminds that when considering a 
defense requests for the jury instruction, the court necessarily "view[s] the 
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the defense." Id. at 1f 10 (quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 
1983). Finally, the Court clarifies, correcting the State's position, that 
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a defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion. "The ultimate 
burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains 
on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove 
affirmative defenses or not." ... Accordingly, a defendant is not required 
to use particular language or key words in his testimony to identify his 
mental state as extreme emotional distress before a jury may consider that 
defense in a criminal trial. As long as the evidence presented at trial 
supports a defendant's theory of the crime and provides a rational basis for 
a verdict on the lesser included offense, a defendant is entitled to the jury 
instruction if he requests it. 
Id. at f 19 (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, as Ms. White has urged, our courts have recognized that there 
are factors or events that may have occurred long before the offense which are 
relevant and therefore appropriately must be considered by a jury in determining 
whether an accused has acted under the influence of "extreme emotional distress 
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." The initiating event need 
not be a violent or tumultuous event. All that is required is that there be "some 
external initiating circumstance" bringing out the distress accompanied by 
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that a reasonable person under 
that stress as viewed under the then existing circumstances would have an extreme 
emotional reaction to it. This determination in this case is a question for the jury 
to decide. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erroneously concluded the law and then misapplied that l^ w 
to the facts of this case as described in the factual section beginning on page 1, 
supra. This Court should find these facts to be more than sufficient evidence tc 
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meet the corrected standard of presenting the case to the jury on the defense of 
extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. 
While the State may take that same evidence and claim an intentional act to 
commit murder, reasonable minds may differ whether the average reasonable 
person under those same stressors and circumstances would have an extreme 
emotional reaction to it and experience a loss of self-control such that the person's 
reason would be overborne by the intense feelings discussed above. That 
understanding is all that is required for this Court to reverse the trial court decision 
and authorize introduction of the defense. 
In Ms. White's case, no single violent event triggered her behavior. Rather 
a loss of self control arguably occurred due to a lengthy repeated and escalating 
pressure overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief, 
excessive agitation and similar emotions. These stressors very realistically were 
extreme and overwhelming for someone in her shoes which were reasonably 
brought about over time by the external forces of Jon White's behavior towards 
her, coupled with the escalating financial pressures and extreme family and work 
stressors, including the death of her doctor and counselor and the changes in her 
medicine regime. Her circumstances meet the requirements of submitting the 
affirmative defense to the jury. 
Accordingly, for all or any of the foregoing reasons, Ms. White 
respectfully requests that this Court grant her appeal, reverse the decision of the 
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trial court and permit her to introduce all relevant facts and present the affirmative 
defense of extreme emotional distress at her jury trial in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <£_ day of^priL 2008. 
A. SCHATZr#W^ 
Attorney for Ms. White 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, # 
I hereby certify that on the^T day of April, 2008,1 have caused one 
original and seven true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and two 
additional copies to be either hand delivered or mailed first class to the following: 
The Office of the Attorney General 
Attn: Kris C. Leonard, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellee 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
27 
I delivered the number of copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Assistantl 
Attorney General Kris C. Leonard as indicated above this day of April, 200&. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Regarding Defendant's 
Motion in Limine re Extreme 
Emotional Distress 
Case No. 061902834 
Hon. WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
This matter came before the Court on October 19 , 2007, for a hearing regarding 
the Defendant's Motion in Limine concerning the defense of Extreme Emotional 
Distress. The Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Jason Schatz. The State 
was represented by Alicia H. Cook and Stephen L. Nelson. The Court has received and 
reviewed Defendant's Motion in Limine re Extreme Emotional Distress and supporting 
memorandum, and the State's Reply. The Court heard oral argument from both parties 
concerning the motion on October 19 , 2007. 
Having fully considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good 
cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
DEC 1 0 ^ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The victim in this case, Jon White, was married to Defendant White for eleven 
years before he left the marital home in November of 2005 and initiated divorce 
proceedings. 
2. Mr. White worked for the Principal Financial Group in the Woodland Towers 
building, located at 4021 South 700 East, which is where he was employed on the 
day of the incident, April 26 ,2006. On that date, Defendant White went to Mr. 
White's place of work during the lunch hour and asked Mr. White to sign a quit-
claim deed to the marital home. Mr. White refused to sign and returned to work. 
3. At approximately 4:30 p.m., Mr. White left the Woodland Towers building and was 
walking toward his car in a covered parking area when he heard the sound of 
squealing tires. Mr. White saw Defendant White speeding toward him in her Ford 
Explorer, and jumped between two parked cars. Mr. White jumped over a three-
foot cement wall at the end of the covered parking structure, and ran through a 
visitor parking lot back toward the Woodland Towers building. As Mr. White 
approached the east entrance of the building, he turned and saw Defendant White > 
speeding through the visitor parking lot after him. Defendant White drove up onto 
the sidewalk leading from the parking lot to the building, and turned the Explorer 
toward the building. Mr. White ran through the first set of doors at the east 
entrance, and Defendant White drove the Explorer through the glass doors. 
Defendant White struck Mr. White with the Explorer and threw him back 
approximately ten feet. Mr. White picked himself up off the ground and ran down a 
corridor to the west lobby on the opposite side of the building. Defendant White 
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chased Mr. White down the hallway and hit him with her vehicle a second time in 
the west lobby. Mr. White flew over the hood of the Explorer and landed on the 
ground. Mr. White stood to run away, but was unable to put any pressure on his left 
leg. Mr. White hobbled down a smaller hallway until he found a service closet, arid 
hid there until he was discovered by a maintenance worker. Defendant White, 
meanwhile, drove her vehicle entirely through the glass windows of the west lobby, 
then reversed her vehicle back into the building and across the lobby. Defendant 
White pulled forward again and stopped her vehicle in the middle of the lobby. The 
incident was first reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office at 4:39 p.m.. 
4. In the defendant's motion in limine, Defendant White proffered the evidence that 
she argued constituted a basis for extreme emotional distress. In summary, the 
defendant proffered that Jon White forced Defendant White to engage in a 
"threesome" with a co-worker, that Jon White viewed pornography and was 
investigated for possession of child pornography, and that Defendant White 
discovered that Mr. White was engaged in an extra-marital affair prior to their 
separation. Defendant White also proffered that she was financially stressed aftei 
the separation, that Jon White only spent the minimum visitation time with their 
children, that Mr. White made the visitation schedule difficult, that Mr. White 
denied owning a cell phone, and that Mr. White promised to assist her with 
refinancing the marital home, but refused to cooperate in the refinance process. 
Defendant White was also being supplied with medications by a nurse practitioner 
named Valerie Talbot who died on March 20th, 2006, due to the fact that Mr. White 
had cancelled the defendant from his insurance policy. The Court does not make 
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u>eo 
any findings of fact concerning the proffered evidence because the Court does not 
weigh the credibility of the evidence for purposes of this motion. (State v. Kruger. 
6P.3d 1116, 1119 (Ut. S.Ct. 2000). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The defense of extreme emotional distress is not applicable to Defendant White's 
case. The circumstances proffered by Defendant White do not constitute extreme 
emotional distress, therefore there is no rational basis in the evidence for the 
defendant's theory that she committed Attempted Manslaughter rather than 
Attempted Homicide. Accordingly, the defendant has not presented a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to warrant jury instructions on the defense of extreme 
emotional distress and the lesser included offense of Attempted Manslaughter. 
The factors proffered by Defendant White do not meet the definition of "extremely 
unusual and overwhelming stress" given in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Ut. 
S.Ct. 1988). The extreme emotional distress defense is available only to defendants 
who have been subjected to stress that would cause the average reasonable person 
to have an extreme emotional reaction and experience a loss of self-control. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471. Defendant White cites marital difficulties, financial stress, 
difficulties with the divorce, and the death of Ms. Talbot as stressors that 
accumulated over time to create a situation wherein she lost self-control on the day 
of the incident. The Court, however, is required to evaluate how these stressors 
would impact the average reasonable person, and whether these stressors would 
cause a reasonable person to experience a loss of self-control. The stressors cited 
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by Defendant White do not rise to this level; they are common occurrences that are 
endured by many people, and in this case do not justify the attempted homicide of 
Jon White. 
The reasonableness of these stressors as an adequate excuse or explanation for a 
loss of self-control is further diminished by the length of time between the stressors 
and the incident. Several of the stressors that Defendant White proffers (the 
threesome, the pornography investigation, and the death of Ms. Talbot) occurred 
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several weeks to years before April 26 , 2006. Furthermore, the Court has 
reviewed the two most recent decisions of the Utah appellate courts dealing with 
extreme emotional distress, and has noted that in both cases a highly provocative 
event occurred immediately before the crime. (State v. Shumway, 3 P.3d 94; State 
v. Spillers, 152 P.2d 315 (Ut S.Ct. 2007). In the case at bar, there is a complete 
absence of a similarly provocative event on or near the day in question. 
The circumstances of the crime itself indicate that Defendant White had not lost 
self-control at the time of the incident, but appeared to be acting in accordance with 
a plan. The disagreement about the quit-claim deed occurred during the noon hoiir, 
and the crime occurred more than four hours later at approximately 4:30, when Mr. 
White was walking across the parking lot toward his vehicle. The complicated 
driving pattern that Defendant White negotiated to pursue Mr. White also indicates 
that Defendant White was aware of what she was doing and was in control of her 
faculties during the time in question. 
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ORDER 
Defendant White's Motion in Limine regarding Extreme Emotional Distress is 
denied. The information that Defendant White has proffered does not constitute evidence 
of extreme emotional distress, and therefore is irrelevant to that defense and may not be 
presented as evidence of extreme emotional distress. 
Dated this JU_ day of Nto#rib€r, 2007. Mi
By the Court: 
WILLIAM W. BA" 
Third District Court'S^ud^SoS^t^ 
Approved as to form: 
Jason Schatz 
Counsel for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM B 
<3o 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
UTAH APPR FATE COURTS 
JAN j j 2008 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Brenda Christine White, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20071008-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and McHugh. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is GRANTED on only the following issue: 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion in 
limine to introduce the affirmative defense of extreme emotional 
distress. 
DATED this 3 / day of January, 2 008, 
FOR THE COURT: 
a^mfi] a T. Greenwood, ^-P ela T. Gre nwo d, 
Presiding Judge 
